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Mads Dagnis Jensen and Dorte Martinsen*
Out of Time? National Parliaments and
Early Decision-Making in the
European Union
Co-decisions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are
increasingly adopted as early agreements. Recent EU studies have pinpointed how
this informal turn in EU governance has altered the existing balance of power
between EU actors and within EU institutions. However, the implications of
accelerated EU decision-making are expected to have repercussions beyond the
EU system and in other institutions impinging on the role of national parliaments.
This study examines the implications of an alteration of EU political time on
national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives in EU affairs. A mixed
method approach has been applied. This strategy combines survey data on
national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early agreements for 26 EU
countries with a case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark,
the UK and Germany. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is
applied. This study ﬁnds that the clocks of most national parliaments are out of
time with the EU decision-mode of early agreements, which severely hampers the
national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize national governments.
AS COMPETENCES ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
and the ordinary legislative power of the European Parliament (EP)
increases, national parliaments are fundamentally challenged.
Scholarly literature has closely examined how national parliaments
have adjusted to the European integration process, but it is split in its
estimation of the overall power that national parliaments have in EU
affairs. One branch of the literature reaches the conclusion that
national parliaments are the main losers in the European integration
process (Auel 2007; Judge 1995; Katz and Wessels 1999; Maurer
and Wessels 2001; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Wessels et al. 2003).
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This branch relies on the so-called ‘deparliamentation thesis’,
according to which the powers of national parliaments have been
eroded by the shift of more and more policy areas to the EU, the
increased use of supranational decision-making rules and the opaque
nature of EU decision-making. The other branch of the literature
questions the ‘deparliamentation thesis’ by painting a more opti-
mistic picture where national parliaments have gradually claimed
power back by institutionalizing various mechanisms of parliamentary
oversight (Auel and Benz 2007; Duina and Oliver 2005; O’Brennan
and Raunio 2007; Raunio and Hix 2000).
This article demonstrates how national parliaments are facing
severe challenges concerning their control in EU affairs. These
challenges imply that the parliaments are currently undergoing a
phase of disempowerment with regard to the EU, which supports the
‘deparliamentation thesis’. In parallel to the enhanced use of the co-
decision procedure empowering the European Parliament and giv-
ing it equal co-legislative status, the increased use of so-called early
agreements between the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers also affects the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU decision-making – a
concept that emphasizes national parliaments as the other important
source of democratic legitimacy (Benz 2004). Meanwhile, co-decision
has increased the number of formal veto players, and early agree-
ments have reduced the circle of de facto decision-makers and
accelerated decision-making (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1209). This
development beneﬁts systemic performance but disturbs the estab-
lished procedures for national parliamentary control and blurs the
natural access point for such control. In line with this argument, the
research question can be formulated as follows: How have national
parliaments adapted to the increased use of early agreements in EU
decision-making?
In order to answer that research question a mixed method
approach will be used. Survey data on national parliaments’ scrutiny
process and response to early agreements have been collected for
26 EU countries1 and combined with case study examinations of
national parliaments in Denmark, the UK and Germany, comparing
scrutiny grounds on a set of parameters. The article ﬁrst examines
how decision-making has been accelerated in the EU and suggests
more general implications for national parliaments. The burgeoning
research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. The research design
and data are then presented. Subsequently, the survey analysis on
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND EARLY DECISION-MAKING 241
© The Authors 2014. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
national parliaments and early agreements is conducted, followed by
the three case studies. Finally some concluding remarks are provided.
OUT OF TIME? NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND EARLY
DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU
Early agreements demonstrate how the EU timescape for decision-
making has changed profoundly during the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-
ﬁrst century. EU time can be deﬁned as ‘the manner in which political
time in the EU is institutionalized along the dimensions of polity,
politics and public policy’ (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 325; for the
research agenda on timescapes, see in particular Goetz 2009; Goetz
and Meyer-Sahling 2009; Grzymala-Busse 2011; Meyer-Sahling and
Goetz 2009). Political time – or more precisely temporality – can be
disaggregated into four constitutive parts: (1) duration (the length of
an event); (2) tempo (speed of change); (3) acceleration (whether
changes speed up or slow down); and (4) timing (when changes
occur) (Grzymala-Busse 2011: 1268).
The timescape of supranational governance greatly affects the
political time in the surrounding multilevel setting. Temporality is a
signiﬁcant feature in national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their
governments’ actions in EU affairs, as the frequency and timing of
scrutiny is an essential part of this parliamentary task. Early agree-
ments imply an acceleration of decisions (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling
2009: 180) and highlight the importance of the temporal rules which
govern political decision-making: ‘If we understand how “the EU
ticks”, we will also gain insights into how it distributes opportunities
for effective participation in decision-making’ (Goetz and Meyer-
Sahling 2009: 181).
As demonstrated below, early agreements are signiﬁcant in poli-
tical time in the EU and have quite fundamentally changed not only
the ‘basic rhythm’ (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 206) but also
the locus and actors of EU decision-making. By inquiring into
changes of EU temporality, we show how such changes have systemic
consequences for the system’s performance, the distribution of
power and legitimacy.2 So far the study of EU timescapes has mainly
concentrated on the EU level (Goetz 2009; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling
2009; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009), but this examination will
demonstrate how timings at the EU and national level have become
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increasingly desynchronized – with implications for the ‘dual legiti-
macy’ of EU politics, according to which the European Parliament
and national parliaments are complementary sources of democratic
legitimacy in the political system of the EU (Benz 2004; Töller 2006).
Accelerated Decision-making; Early Agreements in the EU
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the co-decision I procedure in an
attempt to democratize the EU, granting the European Parliament
equal co-legislative status within a deﬁned set of policy areas
(Shackleton and Raunio 2003). Since then, the co-decision proce-
dure has been extended to an increasing number of policy areas.
With the Lisbon Treaty, it has become the main legislative mode, now
referred to as ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’.3 The increased
involvement of the European Parliament could potentially ‘render
European decision processes, already much too complicated and
time-consuming, even more cumbersome’ (Scharpf 1994: 3). Despite
such expectation, the co-decision procedure has proved to work
efﬁciently (Maurer 2003). The system’s performance has been
secured by formal institutional amendments and ‘informal institu-
tional turns in shared decision-making’ (Farrell and Héritier 2004:
1209). The Amsterdam Treaty amended the co-decision procedure
and thereby the temporal rules that governed decision-making and
thus interaction between the institutions, known as co-decision II.
Since 1999, it has thus been possible to adopt proposals after the ﬁrst
reading in the European Parliament and the Council (Rasmussen
and Shackleton 2005). As Farrell and Héritier (2004) point out, this
amendment of the co-decision procedure introduced an important
innovation by means of ‘early agreements’, making it possible to
fast-track proposals and avoid a second reading or conciliation.
Early agreements are made possible by informal trialogues in which
key actors from the Council and the European Parliament meet
regularly and gradually form the contours of a compromise with the
Commission before formal political positions are taken by national
ministers and MEPs. Scholars have pointed out that these trialogues
have considerable implications for the distribution of power and
democratic legitimacy: ‘The trialogue is the biggest challenge to
democratic legitimacy, for it centralises power in those actors who
represent the Council and the Parliament in the trialogue’ (Chalmers
et al. 2006: 155).
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The frequency of fast-tracked EU decision-making has increased
considerably, as demonstrated in Figure 1. From being a procedure
applied to technical and less controversial proposals (Farrell and
Héritier 2004: 1197), early agreements have grown to be the dominant
decision mode of co-legislation and are increasingly applied to con-
troversial and important proposals (House of Lords 2008–9: 12). In the
legislative year 2008–9, 80 per cent of all co-decision dossiers were
adopted at the ﬁrst reading. It is important to distinguish between ﬁrst
reading agreements based on real early agreements and those that
came about due to the fact that the European Parliament did not
propose any amendments or propose trivial amendments which the
Council accepted (Toshkov and Rasmussen 2012: 5). However, in the
period from 1999 onwards the number of genuine early agreements
has risen, so that more recently they account for above 68 per cent of
the adopted proposal (Toshkov and Rasmussen 2012: 5).
Early agreements mean increasing the system’s performance, but
they also have considerable consequences for the legislative process
and are likely to have implications for the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU
decision-making (Benz 2004; Töller 2006). The decision mode has
decisive consequences for the EU institutions involved, implying that
de facto decisions are being negotiated, detailed and prepared by
a smaller set of key actors: the rapporteur and eventually shadow
rapporteurs in the European Parliament, the Council presidency and
sometimes mediated by the Commission ofﬁcials. As Farrell and
Héritier point out, the decision mode clearly empowers a selected set
of actors, allowing the European Parliament rapporteur and the
Council presidency to command their own sets of information,
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Number of Cases under the Co-decision Procedures Concluded after Different Readings
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/concluded/index_en.htm.
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exchange views, build reciprocal trust and thus accelerate decision-
making (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1200–4).
In order to conclude a dossier by its ﬁrst reading, negotiations need
to begin as soon as the Commission has presented its proposal (Ras-
mussen 2011: 43). An informal trialogue meeting is held when the
European Parliament has appointed its rapporteur and the Council
working group has had a ﬁrst look at the text. This meeting will be
followed by others in which the representatives will report back to their
institutions on the progress of the discussion. When the vote in the
relevant parliamentary committee approaches, the representatives
begin to exchange compromise texts (Farrell and Héritier 2004:
1198). If the representatives can reach an informal compromise, the
European Parliament can include the Council’s position in its ﬁrst
reading amendments and the Council can later adopt the proposal as
amended by the European Parliament (Reh et al. 2013). However, as
the informal negotiations unfold and disagreements are gradually
resolved, it becomes increasingly difﬁcult for the formal arenas such as
COREPER or the parliamentary committee to reopen the negotiations
as this would imply that all the prepared details are discarded again.
The ﬁnal stage – where the compromise text is presented to the
Council of Ministers and voted on in the plenary of the European
Parliament – will generally simply approve what has been put in place
much earlier.
The close early contact between the institutional representatives is
foremost an informal one, which makes it difﬁcult for those who are
not involved to know how far negotiations have developed (European
Parliament 2009: 27). However, informal decision-making seems to be
preferred by both legislators (Häge and Kaeding 2007). The European
Parliament has a greater ability to inﬂuence the compromise nego-
tiated when it is put together in close contact with far fewer Council
actors (Farrell and Héritier 2003). The Council has its own motives for
preferring to close a deal early. In a council with 28 member states it
has become increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnd a common position, meaning
that early input from the European Parliament may facilitate internal
consensus-building in the Council (European Parliament 2009: 11;
Farrell and Héritier 2003; Shackleton and Raunio 2003). Furthermore,
the rotating Council presidencies are eager to close an early deal
during their presidency, and seem ‘to favour 1st reading negotiations
for which the arrangements are much more ﬂexible than in later stages
of the procedure’ (European Parliament 2009: 12).
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Compared with previous timescapes under the co-decision I pro-
cedure, early agreements under the co-decision II procedure are
characterized by the acceleration and delegation of mandates to
negotiate to representatives. This means that fewer actors are the de
facto negotiators trusted to strike a deal with the other co-legislator.
Inter-institutional relations are characterized by much more regular,
but also more informal contacts between the representatives; more-
over, mutual dependence has grown between the institutions. Finally,
a key aspect of the decision mode is timing. The earlier negotiations
are commenced, the more likely a successful and efﬁcient outcome
is. Early agreements thus affect key dimensions in contemporary
EU affairs – power, performance and democratic legitimacy – with
implications for national parliaments.
Early Agreements and the Challenge to National Parliaments
Early agreements, unfolding between the few, also have direct
consequences for external actors trying to inﬂuence and control EU
policymaking. The national parliaments are among these key external
actors. The informal contact and meetings in which decisions are
prepared and negotiated are essentially policy spaces that exclude all
other EU and national actors. Established checks and balances in EU
multilevel governance to a large extent depend on negotiations taking
place in a transparent and predictable way, where there is time to form
opinions and access information in order to pose again the relevant
questions as a means of control. It is important not to equate early
agreements with fast decision-making, as initial studies tended to do,
because recent scholarly evidence suggests that the duration of ﬁrst
readings is longer than the later stage of the decision-making procedure
(Toshkov and Rasmussen 2012: 5). The change that early agreements
make to the national timescape is not in the absolute time spent from a
proposal being put on the table by the Commission to its adoption by
the European Parliament and Council, but rather the change is that
negotiations between a few privileged actors are ‘bunched together over
a short time period’ (House of Lords 2008–9: 18). In other words, it is
not the duration of early agreements which constitutes a challenge for
national parliaments and thus the ‘dual legitimacy’ but the acceleration
of decision-making where the content of the proposal changes rapidly
with only a few privileged actors being present. The changed EU
timescape implies a need for national parliaments to adapt their
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scrutiny process. Table 1 summarizes how early agreements challenge
national parliaments according to the four constitutive parts of
temporality as well as its systemic consequences.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
This article uses a mixed-method strategy by combining survey data and
three case studies (Lieberman 2005). The survey provides a descriptive
chart on how national parliaments are involved in pre-legislation and
early decision-making, how they scrutinize and the resources available for
scrutiny.4 The data have been gathered via an online survey conducted
in early 2010. Before the survey was ofﬁcially sent out, it was tested on a
group of people with expertise in data collection and/or parliamentary
control. The survey was then sent via emails addressed personally to the
academic secretaries of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) in the
respective national parliaments of the 27 member states of the EU in
2010 using the COSAC network contact information.5 In the vast
majority of cases the academic secretary of the European Affairs Com-
mittee is the respondent. A total of 39 surveys were sent out, 37 of which
were answered. Data were ultimately collected for all of the parliaments
with the exception of the two chambers of the Spanish legislature.
Table 1
Temporality in Early Agreements and National Parliaments
Co-decision II and early
agreements National parliaments
Duration More agreements are closed
in ﬁrst readings but these
do not use less time
Does not challenge
national parliaments
per se
Tempo Increase in speed of change Requires that national
parliaments scrutinize
faster
Acceleration Change is characterized by
acceleration
Requires that national
parliaments are able to
speed up suddenly
Timing When change occurs, they
depends on a few actors
Requires that national
parliaments are always
‘ready to act’
Systemic
consequences
Increases systemic
performances
Changes distribution of
power and challenges the
legitimacy of national
parliaments
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Based on the survey data, we conducted three explorative case
studies on how the Danish, UK and German parliaments scrutinize
their respective governments, in order to get a more detailed under-
standing of how the three very different parliaments are handling early
decision-making. The three parliaments are examined by applying ‘the
method of structured-focused comparison’, whereby the three cases
are studied and contrasted using the same parameters, examining the
main remedy for scrutiny, number of cases examined, grounds for
scrutiny, role of special committees, pre-legislation as well as involve-
ment in early agreements (George and Bennett 2004: 67–72). Each
case is comprehensively examined and compared by applying the
process-tracing method, where a number of sources such as interviews
conducted with key respondents in 2009–106 ofﬁcial reports for the
European Affairs Committees and secondary literature is used and
triangulated to obtain the most accurate picture possible (George and
Bennett 2004: 205–32).
EARLY AGREEMENTS: ARE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS LEFT OUT?
According to the survey data, most national parliaments are not
involved in early agreements. For this reason, they have no infor-
mation on and cannot control the drifts of the EU decision-making
taking place in this accelerated form (see Figure 2).
In Figure 2, 16 chambers of parliaments are labelled ‘not informed’,
whereas three note that they are sometimes informed after agreements
are made. Three chambers are informed before early agreements are
closed but cannot give instructions. Seven parliaments note that they
are involved in early agreements and can issue binding instructions to
their governments. The remaining eight chambers of parliaments have
answered ‘other’, and have provided answers elaborating on why they
do not ﬁt the predeﬁned categories. The Estonian Riigikogu notes that
the information ﬂow depends on the sensitivity of the issue. The Danish
Folketing is to be informed about all cases and can in principle instruct
the government; in practice, however, information arrives too late and
instructions are only given in a minority of cases. The Dutch Eerste
Kamer and Slovenian Državni svet write that they are informed if they
request such information. The Hungarian Országgyűlés writes that
involvement depends on the cooperation with the government. In sum,
these parliaments are not involved in early agreements on a systematic
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basis, rendering their ability to exert control conditional. The Latvian
Saeima, on the other hand, notes that if the European Affairs Com-
mittee has already approved a national position but early agreements
imply changes or shifts in national positions, the government is obliged
to receive a new mandate.7 Finally, the Swedish Riksdag has responded
‘other’. Its response appears to encapsulate some of the main chal-
lenges to parliamentary scrutiny when decision-making is accelerated:
The co-decision procedure poses difﬁculties from the point of view of
parliamentary scrutiny. In its practical application, the procedure is lacking in
transparency, and any ‘real’ negotiations are only as an exception taking place
when the proposal is on the table at Council meetings. These difﬁculties are
particularly pronounced in the case of deals being struck in the early stages of
the procedure, when the content of the deal has been negotiated in informal
trialogues with no ‘natural’ points at which to apply parliamentary scrutiny.
(Survey, answer to question 21)
In a secluded actor space, national parliamentarians represent a
set of actors which are left out. The decision mode is characterized by
its own ﬂow, whereas parliamentary scrutiny requires a temporal ‘stand
still’ in order to allow control to be exerted. Informal contact and
trialogues between the mandated representatives leave no ‘natural’
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Figure 2
Parliamentary Involvement in Early Agreements
Note: Question 21 was formulated: ‘How is parliament involved in early agreements,
i.e., ﬁrst reading agreements between the European Parliament and the Council?’.
The categories indicated in the ﬁgure were given as possible answers.
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point of intervention for national parliaments. In the informal tria-
logue setting, the emerging consensus between the Council pre-
sidency and European Parliament representatives renders the state of
ﬂux even more pronounced. The original Commission proposal
which the national parliaments face may no longer be the relevant
text, but de facto negotiations are likely to proceed on the basis of a
signiﬁcantly different text (House of Lords 2008–9: 16). As conclu-
ded by the UK House of Lords, informal trialogues and accelerated
decision-making render parliamentary scrutiny ‘very difﬁcult’ due to
a lack of transparency and the fact that the Council presidency
appears to have the upper hand in this decision mode and to ‘hold its
cards close to its chest’ (House of Lords 2008–9: 16).
A Call for Early Involvement: Accelerating National Scrutiny?
Early decision-making calls for the earlier involvement of national
parliaments. As noted in the survey, ‘“real” negotiations are an
exception once the proposal is on the table at Council meetings’
(Survey data, answer to question 21). The ministerial level tends to
approve what has already been agreed on (Häge 2007; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006). The survey data substantiate the idea
that the majority of the national parliaments issue binding instruc-
tions to their respective governments in EU matters in the late stages
of decision-making. In other words, instructions are given at the
ministerial level immediately before agreements are adopted in the
Council (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 shows that nine chambers are not able to issue instruc-
tions at all; 17 chambers give instructions at the level of the minister;
ﬁve chambers note that they provide instructions when negotiations
start in the relevant Council working group or at the COREPER
level. Six chambers state that they provide instructions at all levels,
depending on the character of the dossier. Not only are national
parliaments latecomers in the control of policymaking in the decision
mode in early agreements, but when instructions are given at the
ministerial level, before the Council meeting, the timing is inade-
quate for them to exert scrutiny with the executive. The real deals
are made much earlier. The increased use of early agreements
suggests that the working group is a more relevant level to give
instructions to.
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This development also suggests that in order to be able to respond
adequately at the earliest stage in the decision-making process,
national parliaments would need to gain information before the
Commission presents its proposal. This means that agenda-setting
becomes an increasingly relevant part of the policy process for all
actors seeking to inﬂuence or control the ﬂow of EU affairs (Börzel
2002; Wallace 2005).
The survey data demonstrate how national parliaments inform
themselves regarding the Commission’s Green and White Papers
in the policy design phase (see Figure 4). Some parliaments also
scrutinize early position papers from their governments. Only the
Belgian Chambre des Représentants, the Hungarian Országgyűlés,
the Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, the Polish Sejm, the Polish Senate
and the Slovakian Národná rada note that they are not involved in
the policy design phase (see Figure 4).
Such pre-legislative involvement prepares the national parliaments
to some extent for what may come. However, early agreements are
likely to disorient the actors in the policy design phase, since Green
and White Papers may at best weakly indicate how negotiations will
proceed. Pre-legislative involvement does not tackle the state of ﬂux
of early agreements which challenge the ability of parliaments to
control and scrutinize what is essentially a fast-moving target.
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Instruction Level
Note: Question 11 was formulated: ‘At what level in the EU decision-making
process does instruction generally take place?’ The question only addresses
the parliaments that are able to issue binding instructions to their governments.
The categories indicated in the ﬁgure were given as possible answers.
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The institutionalization of the yellow and the orange card system
in the Lisbon Treaty may somewhat compensate for the loss of
powers due to early agreements. The procedures give national par-
liaments the possibility of submitting reasoned opinions on draft
legislation, which the Commission is obliged to take account of. The
institutionalization of the procedures and the scholarly studies of
them are still in their early days but evidence suggests that national
parliaments are also challenged here on temporality as their reviews
of proposals are not completed in time (Kaczyński 2011).
Table 2 summarizes the ﬁndings provided in Figures 2–4, arranged
according to the name and type of chamber that responded to the
survey. The table does not show a systematic pattern for why some
parliaments are better equipped to deal with accelerated decision-
making. In order to gain that information, the article now turns to
the case studies of Denmark, the UK and Germany to ﬁnd out how
their national parliaments have organized their scrutiny process and
– eventually – adapted to the new timescape of EU decision-making.
The three parliaments display some variation in this and they score
differently in the scrutiny-level assessment by Raunio (2005: 335):
Denmark ranked highest, Germany in between and the UK ranked as
a relatively weak scrutiny model. Moreover, they have been selected
because they are representative of ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensual’
government conﬁgurations (Auel and Benz 2007; Lijphart 1999) and
because they represent different scrutiny systems – that is, the pro-
cedural and the document-based model, which will be elaborated
below (Sprungk 2010).
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Figure 4
Parliamentary Involvement in the Policy Design Phase
Note: Question 16 was formulated: ‘Is the parliament involved in the pre-legislation
phase?’ The categories indicated in the ﬁgure were given as possible answers.
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Table 2
National Parliaments and Early Agreements
Early agreements Instruction level Policy design
Austria, Nationalrat Strong Working group Moderate
Austria, Bundesrat Strong All levels Strong
Belgium, Chambre des Représentants Moderate Minister Very weak
Belgium, Sénat Very weak All levels Weak
Bulgaria, Narodno Sabranie Moderate Minister Moderate
Cyprus, Vouli ton Antiprosópon Very weak No Weak
Czech Republic, Poslanecká sněmovna Strong All levels Strong
Czech Republic, Senate Very weak All levels Strong
Denmark, Folketinget Moderate Minister Weak
Estonia, Riigikogu Weak Working group Strong
Finland, Eduskunta Strong Working group Moderate
France, Assemblée Nationale Very weak Minister Weak
France, Sénat Very weak Minister Weak
Germany, Bundesrat Very weak Minister Weak
Germany, Bundestag Weak No Strong
Greece, Vouli ton Ellinon Very weak Working group Weak
Hungary, Országgyűlés Moderate Minister Very weak
Ireland, Houses of the Oireachtas Very weak No Weak
Italy, Camera dei Deputati Strong All levels Strong
Italy, Senato della Republica Very weak COREPER Weak
Latvia, Saeima Moderate Minister Moderate
Lithuania, Seimas Very weak All levels Strong
Luxembourg, Chambre des Députés Very weak No Weak
Malta, Kamra tad-Deputati Very weak Minister Very weak
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Table 2 (Continued )
Early agreements Instruction level Policy design
Netherlands, Eerste Kamer Moderate No Weak
Netherlands, Tweede Kamer Very weak Minister Strong
Poland, Sejm Weak Minister Very weak
Poland, Senate Very weak Minister Very weak
Portugal, Assembleia da Republica Very weak Minister Weak
Romania, Camera Deputatilor Weak No Weak
Romania, Senat Very weak Minister Strong
Slovakia, Národná rada Strong Minister Very weak
Slovenia, Državni zbor Strong Minister Strong
Slovenia, Državni svet Weak No Strong
Sweden, Riksdag Moderate Minister Strong
UK, House of Commons Moderate No Weak
UK, House of Lords Moderate No Weak
Notes: Early agreements: ‘Strong’ – parliament is informed before early agreements and can give instructions; ‘Moderate’ –
parliament is informed before early agreements but cannot give instructions; ‘Weak’ – parliament is sometimes informed after
agreements are made; ‘Very weak’ – parliament is not informed; ‘Other’ – allocated according to the highest degree of ﬁt with
the previous mentioned categories. Policy design: ‘Strong’ – commenting on Green/White Papers and scrutinizing position
papers; ‘Moderate’ – scrutinizing position papers; ‘Weak’ – commenting on Green/White Papers; ‘Very weak’ – parliament is not
involved in this phase; ‘Other’ – allocated according to the highest degree of ﬁt with the previous mentioned categories.
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PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY AND EARLY AGREEMENTS IN DENMARK
Denmark is often held to be the member state in which the national
parliament has the greatest power in EU affairs and it has been con-
sidered the ‘scrutiny leader’ (Holzhacker and Albæk 2007; Raunio
2005; Sprungk 2010). The centre of parliamentary control of the
government in EU affairs is the European Affairs Committee. The
Danish control system is a procedural system focusing on the govern-
ment position in the Council and giving direct mandates (COSAC
2007). According to the procedure, the government must present a
position paper in cases of considerable signiﬁcance and must inform
the committee about important cases (Market Committee 1974). The
government, however, presents position papers on most cases and has
these accepted by the European Affairs Committee in approximately
90–95 per cent of these cases due to the comprehensive consultation
of affected interests beforehand and because it has anticipated the
mandate allocation in the committee beforehand, when framing its
proposal (Jensen 2003: 156). On the Friday before the Council meet-
ing, the relevant minister will go to the European Affairs Committee
and make an oral presentation of the proposed negotiating position.
The position is approved (mandated) unless members of the European
Affairs Committee representing 90 mandates or more explicitly assert
that they are against it (Damgaard and Jensen 2005).
Political time in the Danish scrutiny model is increasingly desyn-
chronized with the timing of EU decision-making. The European Affairs
Committee has repeatedly requested more detailed information and
the need for consultation earlier in the negotiation process (Esmark
2002; Sousa 2008). It has, however, proved difﬁcult to institutionalize
a way of achieving this, and early agreements thus pose signiﬁcant
challenges to the Danish model. Early agreements imply that giving
a mandate at the ministerial level is one stage too late. It would be
reasonable to give the mandate at the COREPER level, or better timing
to give the mandate at the working group level in the Council – and
to renew such mandates when informal negotiations produce new
positions. At the ministerial level, it is almost impossible to alter an
agreement between the Council and European Parliament in cases
where the Danish government fails to obtain its mandate.
It has also been pointed out that although early positions are
formulated in the government, they are not systematically presented
to the parliament (Interview I). In some situations, the government
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holds that the establishment of compromise involving trialogues
prior to the ﬁrst reading in the European Parliament is a delicate
and rather conﬁdential process which renders the presentation of
positions impossible (Interview IV). In other situations, the govern-
ment may not have sufﬁcient information itself from the Council
presidency (Interview VII). The European Affairs Committee mem-
bers have noted that ﬁrst reading agreements are an increasing
problem for parliamentary control, since the information provided
by the government to the parliament is too little, too late – often after
COREPER has mandated the presidency (COSAC 2009: annex, 30;
Interview VII). At this stage, the Danish government as a Council
member has already given the presidency a mandate to negotiate,
without having received any mandate from the Danish parliament.
This development severely challenges the ability of the parliament to
control the government. It thus challenges the distribution of power
in the Danish polity.
As early as March 2006, the former president of the European
Affairs Committee pointed out that early agreements had outdated
the Danish mandating system which scrutinized proposals in the late
stages of decision-making (Auken 2006). In light of the acceleration
of policymaking, he suggested that parliamentary mandates should
be given much earlier. This was followed by an ofﬁcial request from
the European Affairs Committee to the government to present its
position as early as possible (Danish European Affairs Committee
2006). The government responded by noting that in cases of early
agreement, it would aim to present its position before COREPER
mandates the presidency to negotiate (Danish Foreign Ministry
2011). Ideally, this would mean that the government would request
its mandate from the European Affairs Committee when the pre-
sidency asks for a mandate from COREPER to initiate negotiations
in the ﬁrst trialogue. However, in practice, the government appears
to request its mandate when the presidency asks COREPER for a
mandate to close a deal with the European Parliament (Interview
VII). Issuing a mandate in the late phase of COREPER negotiations
stands out as being another stage that is too late, since negotiations
between Council representatives must have begun far earlier in order
to reach a common position in the Council. To take part in such
negotiations, the individual governments must have formed their
positions at an earlier stage, presumably when the relevant working
group started to act. Furthermore, the government response does not
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consider the ﬂow of fast-track decision-making and does not guarantee
that it will return to the European Affairs Committee when positions
change during negotiations. However, even the government may not
have sufﬁcient information to present, as it may be far from fully
informed itself regarding the progress in trialogues.
Finally, the Danish European Affairs Committee is not very engaged
in the preparatory stages of EU policymaking. The involvement of
the European Affairs Committee is limited when it comes to inﬂuen-
cing the European Commission on a more direct, concrete level by
uploading its own regulatory models or attempting to shape proposals
which are in the pipeline (Survey question 16). The general view seems
to be that actions taken by ministers before proposals are ofﬁcially
launched by the European Commission fall within the jurisdiction of
the government (Interviews I, II, III).
In sum, the changed temporality of EU decision-making imposes
severe challenges on the Danish parliament’s ability to control its
government when agreements are prepared and negotiated in the
EU political system. The tempo of the Danish scrutiny model was
established in accordance with the old Community clock and has so
far been unable to adapt to the EU political time of early agreement.
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY AND EARLY AGREEMENTS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
In contrast to Denmark, the British parliamentary scrutiny system
does not mandate the minister before agreements can be made in
the Council (Survey question 10). The British system is an example
of a classical document-based system (COSAC 2007) in which EU
documents are sifted through at the early stage of the decision-
making process. Some scholars have found the model to have a
low level of scrutiny (see, for example the scoreboard of Raunio 2005:
335) and others claim that it actually carries out quite detailed par-
liamentary scrutiny (Auel 2007: 501–2).
As such, the British scrutiny system does not control the executive in
a strict sense, instead examining the content and impact of proposals
through scrutiny. This form of parliamentary scrutiny is divided between
the House of Commons and House of Lords. The two chambers have
each established a European Affairs Committee responsible for holding
the government accountable. The main mechanism is the so-called
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scrutiny reserve, which implies that the government is not allowed to
give consent to EU cases which the two houses have not yet examined or
are still examining (Cygan 2007: 172–3; Hazell and Paun 2010). The
government must await the clearance of the scrutiny reserve before
taking action.
Beginning with the House of Commons, which is the elected body of
the two chambers, the European Scrutiny Committee processes more
than 1,000 documents annually.8 According to the rules of procedure,
the government must submit documents from the Commission within
two days of receiving them (Cygan 2007: 165–9). The government must
then submit a so-called explanatory memorandum within two weeks,
with a description of the proposal and its implication (Cygan 2007:
165–9). Based on this information, the committee will decide whether
the document is politically and/or legally signiﬁcant (Interview VI). All
documents deemed politically and/or legally important are reported
on at length in the committee’s weekly reports. The committee also has
the power to recommend documents for debates, which take place in a
European Committee or (more rarely) in the House of Commons.
Under the scrutiny reserve resolution of 17 November 1998 passed by
the House, ministers should not vote in the Council of Ministers
on proposals which the committee has not cleared or which are
awaiting debate. Moreover, the committee may refer documents to
departmental select committees, although the most common option is
to refer the documents to one of the subcommittees on EU affairs. As
the House of Commons applies a document-based scrutiny system, the
earliest stage at which the system is initiated is when the Commission
launches a Green or White Paper (Survey question 16), but the system
is not activated before a formal proposal is placed on the table. The
House of Commons should be informed before an early agreement is
reached but it is not in a position to instruct (Survey question 21).
Initially, the House of Commons assumed that contentious proposals
would not be subject to early agreements (Interview VI). This
assumption has, however, been challenged as ﬁrst reading agreements
are prevalent and are also used on proposals which are politically
salient (Interview VI). Early agreements thus challenge the scrutiny
system due to their fast tempo and the opaque nature of the decision
mode which makes it difﬁcult to apply the scrutiny reserve. The House
of Commons has informed the government about this difﬁculty but no
concrete measures have been set in place to better synchronize the
European and the national timescape (Interview VI).
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The House of Lords, which is the unelected, second chamber of the
UK parliament, exercises control via its EU Committee. Every week,
the committee chair and legal adviser sift through all of the documents
which the government has deposed (Interview V). Approximately
half of the cases of a routine nature are cleared by the committee
chair, meaning that the government can go ahead and decide on
them. The other dossiers, which raise political or legal questions,
are allocated to one of the seven subcommittees under the select
committee. The subcommittees meet weekly, where a background
note will be prepared for each case by a committee clerk (Interview V).
Committee clerks will also prepare a draft letter for the minister if
something needs to be clariﬁed before the committee can lift the
scrutiny reserve. Based on the information provided by the minister,
the committee will decide whether to clear the proposal or to inves-
tigate further by inviting the minister to provide evidence before the
committee (Cygan 2007: 169–71). Before the minister arrives at the
session, committee clerks and specialists will have prepared a number
of questions, which are divided between the members. In cases of
greater signiﬁcance, the committee will produce a report. In com-
parison with the House of Commons, many members of the House of
Lords European Union Committee have considerable expertise in EU
matters, having held high positions such as commissioner, COREPER
ambassadorships and European Parliament presidency in the course
of their professional lives (Interview V).
The extended use of early agreements and the informal trialogues
have caused considerable concern in the House of Lords over how to
respond to these challenges in order to hold the government
accountable. These concerns are raised in one of the House of Lords’
reports, dealing exclusively with co-decisions and national parlia-
mentary scrutiny (House of Lords 2008–9). In order to deal with the
challenges implied by co-decisions and early agreements, the EU
Committee suggests adjusting the existing systems of parliamentary
scrutiny in a number of ways (House of Lords 2008–9). Firstly, it
suggests that the government must update the parliament without
any delay if there have been changes in the proposal that have policy
implications. Secondly, it is suggested that the House of Lords ofﬁce
in Brussels should be allowed access to documents that are being
negotiated under the co-decision procedure in the Permanent Brit-
ish Representation in order to be up to date on how the negotiations
evolve. Thirdly, the British government is expected in the future to
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send documents from the Council which are marked LIMITE.
Fourthly, the importance of the above-mentioned need for sending
reports to MEPs who are involved in cases negotiated under the co-
decision procedure is emphasized, together with the need to inform
other national parliaments via a common database. Despite these
explicit recommendations from the House, the amendments have so
far not been transformed into reality (Interview X).
The practice in the two Houses differs as to how scrutiny is exer-
cised and how the changes of EU temporality are faced. The House
of Lords carries out in-depth inquiries early in the decision-making
phase of a limited number of key cases, whereas the House of
Commons produces a weekly report summarizing the background
notes of all of the proposals under scrutiny. The established division
of labour between the Houses and their respective manners of EU
dedication means that parliamentary EU control is tackled from
different angles and forums. The earlier actions of the Lords can
bring information to the Commons on when to be aware and on
what to focus. The document-based system may therefore contain
different ways of tackling the new challenges of tempo, acceleration
and timing that the mandating system has not (yet) fully developed.
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY AND EARLY AGREEMENTS IN GERMANY
Like the British system, and in contrast to the Danish one, the German
system is a document-based system in which proposals from the EU
institutions are singled out for scrutiny (COSAC 2007: 15). The German
parliament has been criticized for not making full use of its formal
rights to scrutinize the government and thus performs relatively weakly
compared with other models (Auel 2007: 493; Sprungk 2010; Töller
2004, 2006).
The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (Ausschuss
für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union), also called the
EU Committee, is the hub of coordination in the Bundestag. The
committee is responsible for cases concerning European integration,
whereas specialized committees are responsible for scrutinizing sector-
speciﬁc proposals from the EU. All documents from the government
go through the EU Committee, which allocates them to relevant com-
mittees (Interview VIII). The transmitted documents have attached
forwarding letters with information on the main substance, the legal
260 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Authors 2014. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
basis, the applicable procedure and the leading federal ministry
(EUZBBG 2013: section 5). A special administrative unit under the
auspices of the EU Committee, called PA1 (Europa Referat), sifts the
documents and suggests a prioritization to the parliamentary groups
(Interview VIII).
The prioritized dossiers will then be allocated to the relevant special
committee(s) of the Bundestag. The responsible committee(s) will
make use of questions to the government, together with written reports,
as the basis for its scrutiny before crafting a resolution. The EU Com-
mittee can suggest amendments or adjust the resolution from the lead
committee before transmitting it to the plenary (Rules of Procedure of
the German Bundestag 2013: Rule 93b (7)). Based on the resolution,
the plenary adopts a motion, which the federal government must follow
in the Council of Ministers (EUZBBG 2013: section 9). However, the
government can deviate from that motion if it has compelling reasons,
in which case it will have to appear before the relevant committee in
the Bundestag to explain the reasons for the deviation (Survey question
10; Linn and Sobolewski 2010: 59–62).
On 28 September 2006, the Bundestag made an agreement with the
government that tightens the procedural demands.9 This agreement
was adjusted on 30 September 2009 to accommodate the 30 June 2009
ruling from the German Federal Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
which found the role of the two chambers of parliament to be insuf-
ﬁcient to counteract the transfer of competencies to the EU. This
implied that the agreement governing the relationship between the
parliament and the government was changed, most signiﬁcantly by
making it legally binding (Beichelt 2012: 145). The adjusted coopera-
tion law also stresses the importance of a subsidiary check, according to
which the Bundestag should consider within eight weeks whether or
not a case fulﬁls the principles of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Despite the empowering of the Bundestag following the ruling
from the Constitutional Court, the parliament has severe problems
dealing with early agreements. There is no advanced system in place
in the Bundestag which can keep up with accelerated legislative
process at the European level and the chamber is sometimes only
informed after an agreement has been made (Interview VIII; Survey
question 21). The Bundestag only receives non-papers (that is,
informal and non-binding papers) regarding early agreement, if it
receives any information at all from the government (Survey question
16). This makes it extremely difﬁcult for the Bundestag to monitor
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and control what is happening and in the vast majority of cases the
government is not held accountable.
The government is obliged to inform the second chamber of the
German parliament, the Bundesrat, about new dossiers emanating
from the EU as early as possible. Upon receipt, the EU Secretariat of
the Bundesrat goes through the proposals and decides which to
scrutinize (Interview IX). On average, 100–150 documents are pre-
selected for inspection per year. Based on the preselection process, the
secretary general on behalf of the president of the Bundesrat allocates
the proposals to relevant sector committee(s). The sector committees
then scrutinize the proposals and give a statement to the Committee on
European Union Questions (EU Committee, Ausschuss für Fragen der
Europäischen Union). The federal government will appear before both
the sector committees and the EU Committee to engage in dialogue.
Based on the views given by the relevant sector committees, the EU
Committee deliberates on the proposal. It is the EU Committee that is
competent to decide whether or not to support the views from the sector
committees. Regarding early agreements, the Bundesrat is even more
challenged than the Bundestag because it is not informed and there is
no infrastructure in place which is synchronized with fast-track decision-
making at the European level (Interview IX; Survey question 21).
In sum, when EU temporality requires the German Bundestag and
Bundesrat to act faster and to be poised to act in order to control its
government in EU affairs, the national parliament cannot do so
due to lack of information. At the same time as the Bundestag has
gained powers in relation to subsidiarity checks, a lack of information
prevents it from adapting to the accelerated and secluded decision-
making forums of the EU. The changed tempo and timing of the
EU makes it increasingly difﬁcult to scrutinize the government in a
sufﬁcient and systematic manner.
CONCLUSION
Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative mode in a European
Union enlarged to 28 member states. Scholars have noted that nei-
ther the increased powers of the European Parliament nor enlarge-
ment have slowed down supranational decision-making, which seems
to operate according to ‘business as usual’ (Meyer-Sahling
and Goetz 2009: 329; Wallace 2007). This is, however, not the case.
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The accelerated and growing informality of decision-making has
wide implications beyond time-estimated performance. Performance
by means of efﬁciency may be largely intact, but the distribution of
power and democratic legitimacy is not. The analysis in this article has
demonstrated how EU early agreements have considerable implica-
tions for national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives.
EU decision-making and the national scrutiny of it operate in many
cases according to different, desynchronized timescapes. It has been
pointed out that ‘EU institutions do not run to the same clock’ (Goetz
2009: 210). The ﬁndings of this article add that national parliaments’
ability to control EU decision-making rely on the clock of yesterday,
thus reinforcing desynchronized timescapes. The changes in the deci-
sion mode upset national models of parliamentary scrutiny as they were
institutionalized at a very different time, when member states were
fewer, the European Parliament had much less power and decisions
were normally taken on the basis of consensus. National executives
were thus more directly responsible for their EU actions, whereas today
many decisions are prepared and de facto taken on behalf of the large
majority of national executives. The minister comes to lack full infor-
mation when represented by the Council presidency in the trialogues,
where certain pressure exists to close a deal as early as possible. The
degree of closure and acceleration in the informal setting may essen-
tially sideline the object of control itself: the government. One way to
remedy this problem could be to exploit informal linkages between
European and national levels, for instance where members of the same
national political party provide inside information about the negotia-
tions (Jensen and Nedergaard 2012). Existing empirical evidence sug-
gests that linkages between MEPs and national parliamentarians are
weak (Raunio 2009: 324) but informal linkages are tools which carry
potential for enhancing national parliamentarians level of control.
The three case studies indicate that none of the scrutiny models is
keeping pace with the acceleration of EU decision-making. Never-
theless, important differences are apparent, which may better enable
the House of Lords in the UK system to tackle the increased need
for early action. When comparing the scrutiny process on different
parameters, the House of Lords stands out as the more proactive
chamber (see Table 3).
The House of Lords handles a limited, selected number of cases but
subsequently invests signiﬁcantly greater resources in the scrutiny process
and carries out much more detailed examination. Furthermore, its
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Table 3
Comparing Parliamentary Scrutiny
Country Denmark United Kingdom Germany
Parliament Folketinget Commons Lords Bundestag Bundesrat
Main remedy Mandating procedure:
government must
present a position
paper which cannot be
opposed by an
expressed majority
Document-based procedure: government must not take
action in the EU until the two chambers have
scrutinized a proposal – the scrutiny reserve
Document-based procedure: government must
notify the parliament comprehensively and
as early as possible. If necessary, the
government should apply the scrutiny
reserve to allow time for parliament to
deliberate on the proposal and issue an
opinion
Number of cases
examined
Most cases are examined Most cases are examined A selected number of
cases are examined
Most cases are
examined
Some cases are examined
Grounds for scrutiny On the basis of basic,
topical and summary
notes formulated by
the government
On the basis of
explanatory
memorandums
formulated by
government
On the basis of
background notes
and possible
reports formulated
by the House of
Lords
Notes produced
by the
government
Notes produced by the
government
Special committees Special committees
sometimes involved
Departmental
committees sometimes
involved
Special EU
subcommittees
highly involved
Sector committees
highly involved
Sector committees highly
involved
Pre-legislation European Affairs
Committee may
examine Green and
White Papers
European Affairs
Committee examines
Green and White
Papers
Subcommittees
conduct inquiries,
summarized in
reports to the
Commission. Also
increasingly
sending own
reports to the
Comments on
Green and
White Papers
Comments on Green and
White Papers
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Table 3 (Continued )
Country Denmark United Kingdom Germany
European
Parliament
Early agreements No systematic
information on early
governmental
position. Information
given to parliament at
times after COREPER
has mandated the
presidency to
negotiate and the
Danish government
thus de facto has
committed itself to a
position
May be informed, but
cannot give
instructions. Not
necessarily updated
when negotiation
positions change. Does
not have access to all
relevant documents
May be informed, but
cannot give
instructions. Not
necessarily
updated when
negotiation
positions change.
Does not have
access to all
relevant
documents
Arbitrary scrutiny
of position
papers
No involvement in regard
to early agreements
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grounds for scrutiny do not depend on explanatory memorandums or
summary notes from the government, operating instead on the basis of
its own reports or notes worked out by its own employees. Thus, the
independent analytical capacity is higher. Moreover, the high involve-
ment of special committees enhances the scrutiny capacity of the
House of Lords. The Lords proactively attempts to inﬂuence both the
Commission and the European Parliament by scrutinizing develop-
ments and initiatives and sending its own reports to the agenda-setters
in the Commission and the decision-makers in the European Parlia-
ment, including the powerful rapporteurs. In this manner, the House
of Lords appears to have adapted to the increased need for early action
in the EU policy cycle. In contrast, the European Affairs Committee in
Denmark continues to concentrate on the late stage of decision-making
when a mandate is given to the minister. Although Denmark is
renowned for its strong model of parliamentary control, it lags behind
in its efforts to adapt to the new temporal rules of EU decision-making.
Germany has not yet accelerated its national scrutiny either and
experiences a lack of information on position formation in the infor-
mal trialogues. So far no infrastructure has been put in place which is
synchronized with fast-track decision-making at the European level.
This article has examined the implications of early agreements
in EU decision-making for the national legislators’ ability to scrutinize
their executives. The temporal rules that govern EU politics have
changed (Goetz 2009), but many national clocks have far from adapted
and are out of time. Whereas the performance of the system may be
intact, the implications for power and democratic legitimacy stand out.
As far as the distribution of power is concerned, these ﬁndings support
the ‘deparliamentation’ thesis. More than half of the national legisla-
tors have lost power, not this time to the executive (Goetz 2000; Raunio
2006; Wessels et al. 2003), but instead to the few actors of delegated
responsibility. Regarding democratic legitimacy, the ﬁndings suggest
that the ‘dual legitimacy’ of EU politics (Benz 2004; Töller 2006) is
more challenged than is often assumed.
NOTES
1 All national chambers responded, except Spain. Croatia was not a member yet.
2 As Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2009: 193) point out, ‘political time is intimately
connected to power, system performance and legitimacy and the way time is
institutionalized is critical to the way a political system works’.
266 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
© The Authors 2014. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
3 The Maastricht Treaty had 15 articles regulated according to co-decision. This
increased to 38 articles with the Amsterdam Treaty and to 44 articles in the
Nice Treaty (Rasmussen and Shackleton 2005). The Lisbon Treaty means that
89 articles are now regulated according to what is now called the ‘ordinary legislative
procedure’.
4 A copy of the survey is available upon request.
5 See www.cosac.eu/en/mailbox/parliaments.
6 Members of the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament, August 2009;
policy advisers to the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament, October
2009; policy analyst, EU Select Committee, UK House of Lords, September 2009; chair,
EU Select Committee, UK House of Lords, September 2009; clerk of the European
Scrutiny Committee, UK House of Commons, December 2009; Ministerialrätin,
Deutscher Bundesrat Büro des Ausschusses für Fragen der Europäischen Union,
February 2010; Referentin im Sekretariat des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der
Europäischen Union, Deutscher Bundestag, February 2010.
7 The Belgian House of Representatives has not answered this question.
8 www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-
scrutiny-committee/role.
9 Agreement between the German Bundestag and the federal government on coopera-
tion in matters concerning the European Union in implementation of Section 6 of the
Act on Cooperation between the federal government and the German Bundestag of
28 September 2006.
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